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Pedro Aguilar-Raygoza v. State, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 27 (June 02, 2011)1
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO TRIAL; EQUAL PROTECTION
Summary
An appeal from a judgment denying eligibility for an alcohol treatment diversion program
following Appellant’s conviction from a jury trial.
Disposition and Outcome
The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s denial of Appellant’s request to
participate in the alcohol treatment program set forth under NRS 484C.110,2 finding that the
statute (1) did not unnecessarily burden defendant’s right to trial and (2) did not deprive
defendant of his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.
Factual and Procedural History
The State charged Appellant Aguilar- Raygoza (“Aguilar”) with his third offense of driving
under the influence, a felony.3 Aguilar pleaded not guilty and went to trial, where a jury
convicted him. Prior to his sentencing hearing, Aguilar requested to be placed in the alcohol
treatment program set forth in NRS 484C.340. Under 484C.340, a defendant who pleads guilty
or nolo contendere to his first felony DUI may apply to the court to undergo an alcohol treatment
program. However, the court is free to deny the application and sentence defendant to prison
time. Even if the court grants the application, the defendant must still obtain acceptance from a
treatment facility, satisfactorily complete treatment, and comply with any other conditions
ordered by the court. Failure to satisfy any of these conditions allows the court to enter a
judgement of conviction and sentence the defendant to prison time.
The district court held a hearing to determine Aguilar’s eligibility for the treatment program.
At the eligibility hearing, Aguilar contested NRS 484C.340’s requirement that defendant must
enter a guilty plea to be eligible for the treatment program as unconstitutional. Aguilar also
argued that this requirement penalizes defendants who invoke their right to trial, thus depriving
them of equal protection of the law. The district court rejected Aguilar’s argument. In rejecting
Aguilar’s argument, the district court applied rational basis review, finding that participation in
an alcohol treatment program is not a fundamental right.4 Under this standard, the district court
found that NRS 484C.340 is not unconstitutional because the statute did not significantly
interfere with defendant’s fundamental right to a jury trial. The district court sentenced Aguilar
to thirty months in prison and a $2000 fine, and this appeal followed.

1
2
3
4

By Michael Li.
The statute was formerly numbered NEV. REV. STAT. 484.37941
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 484C.110 & 484C.400(1)(c) (2007).
Blanton v. N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541-43 (1989).

Discussion
NRS 484C.340 did not unnecessarily burden Aguilar’s right to trial
Justice Cherry, writing for the unanimous three-judge panel, first considered Aguilar’s
argument that NES 484C.340 unnecessarily burdened his right to trial. Relying on United States
v. Jackson,6 Aguilar first argued that NRS 484C.340 placed an unconstitutional burden on his
right to a trial by conditioning his eligibility for the treatment program upon a waiver of that
right. However, the Court found that NRS 484C.340 more closely resembled the statute in
Corbitt v. New Jersey,7 as one that provides leniency to those defendants who enter pleas.
Specifically, the Court distinguished the statute in Jackson by noting that (1) the Corbitt statute
did not involve the death penalty and (2) defendant may still suffer the maximum penalty, even if
a plea was entered. The Court also emphasized the policy basis for statutes that encourage
defendants to waive their right to trial: tolerance and promotion of plea negotiations. On the basis
of such policy, cases following Corbitt have distinguished between statutes providing leniency
and statutes imposing punishment.8 Those cases have concluded that denial of a sentence
reduction based on defendant’s refusal to accept responsibility does not constitute punishment.
Here, the Court concluded that NRS 484C.340 did not unnecessarily burden defendant’s
exercise of his right to trial because like the Corbitt statute, there is no provision for the death
penalty and the maximum sentence may still be imposed for those who chose to plead.
Moreover, although the statute forces Aguilar to make a difficult choice between accepting a
plea versus going to trial, the statute provides leniency to the same extent that defendants who
enter pleas receive lesser sentences.
NRS 484C.340 did not deprive Aguilar of equal protection of the law9
The Court next considered Aguilar’s equal protection claim. Aguilar argued that NRS
484C.340 violated his right to equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment
because it penalized defendants exercising their right to trial by depriving them of the possibility
of a lesser sentence. In rejecting Aguilar’s equal protection challenge, the Court again
emphasized that entering a plea does not guarantee a more favorable outcome for defendants
pursuant to NRS 484C.340. Citing Corbitt, the Court noted that equal protection does not free
defendants from the consequences of their bad choices. Had Aguilar chose to enter a plea, he
would have given up the chance for an acquittal at trial. Thus, the Court declined to apply strict
scrutiny, since NRS 484C.340 did not infringe on Aguilar’s fundamental right to trial.
Applying a rational basis review, the Court concluded that NRS 484C.340 did not deprive
Aguilar of his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The statute extends a
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United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
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Dzul v. State, 118 Nev. 681, 692, 56 P.3d 875, 882-83 (2002).
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The Court also rejected Aguilar’s argument that the statute violated his substantive due process right under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, finding that he was lawfully sentenced based on his jury
conviction, so the statute did not operate to deprive him of life, liberty, or property without due process or for
arbitrary reasons.
7

limited degree of leniency to defendants who enter a plea. Moreover, the statute furthers the
legitimate governmental purpose of conserving prosecutorial resources.
Conclusion
NRS 484C.110 is constitutional and does not place an excessive burden on a defendant’s
fundamental right to trial. The statute does not unnecessarily burden a defendant’s right to trial
because while the statute encourages plea bargains, the consequences of choosing a trial are not
so adverse as to amount to an unconstitutional burden on the right to trial. NRS 484C.110 does
not violate a defendant’s right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The statute
does not deprive a defendant of equal protection because either choice, plea bargain or going to
trial, carries the possibility of lesser sentences.

